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LACHS V. FIDELITY &
CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK:
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Jeffrey W. Stempel*
The publication of Judge Keeton's important article "inventing" the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine in 1971 is notable for infusing a good deal of
intellectual energy into the study of insurance law, particularly judicial deci-
sions about insurance coverage.1 Keeton's article, which deduced from cases
the principle that courts tended to interpret policies to vindicate the objectively
reasonable expectations of the insured,2 has rightly been viewed as a mile-
stone.3 It clarified an area of law long seen as inconsistent or result-oriented.
It spurred additional important scholarship in the area and elevated insurance
caselaw from something of a backwater to at least a respectable academic disci-
pline, even if not quite an exciting one.4
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' See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions 1, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970) [hereinafter Rights at Variance].
2 Id. at 967.
1 This particular Keeton article has been cited hundreds of times and has been the subject of
considerable academic commentary. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations:
Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology
of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181 (1998). See generally Peter N. Swisher, Symposium
Introduction, The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations after Three Decades,
5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998).
1 "Backwater" is perhaps harsh. Prior to the Rights at Variance article, there were, of
course, well-regarded texts about insurance law and a number of significant articles, many of
them also by Keeton. See, e.g., EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW: AN
OUTLINE OF LEGAL DOCTRINES IN THEIR RELATIONS TO INSURANCE PRACTICES (2d ed. 1957)
(republished in 1985); WILLIAM REYNOLDS VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE
(1904); Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 1136 (1954); Robert E. Keeton, Preferential Settlement of Liability-Insurance Claims,
70 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1956); William R. Vance, The History of the Development of the
Warranty in Insurance Law, 20 YALE L.J. 523 (1911).
However, insurance law scholarship prior to Keeton's Rights at Variance article was
generally less plentiful, more formalistic and wooden and less intellectually reflective than
that found in many areas of law. Since the Rights at Variance article, insurance law has seen
an explosion of casebooks, treatises, and scholarly commentary, much of it by the partici-
pants in this Symposium. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT Dis-
PUTEs (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2001) (bibliography listing insurance law books and articles
reflects greater activity during 1980s and 1990s than during the first two-thirds of the cen-
tury). Although some of this results simply from the growth of the legal profession and the
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But as important as Keeton's article was, it to some extent perhaps even
understated the extent to which courts had long utilized the reasonable expecta-
tions concept without mentioning it by that name. It also tended to underplay
the degree to which courts construed insurance contracts in light of their
intended purpose, irrespective of whose expectations were involved.5 Most
important for purposes of this Symposium topic, Keeton's seminal article cited
Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York6 only in passing. The short
treatment seems unusual in that Lachs is a most interesting case from the then-
largest state in the nation, a case that utilized not only the reasonable expecta-
tions principle, but also an array of contract concepts designed to illuminate the
apt meaning of the insurance policy.
Furthermore, Keeton arguably mischaracterizes Lachs as a case that is
straining to construe the insurance policy to provide coverage. He suggested
that Lachs had "tortured" the policy language and in effect applied a sub silen-
tio strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine that protects policy-
holder expectations even in the face of clear contrary policy language.7 To be
sure, Lachs utilized the reasonable expectations approach and did so nearly
twenty years before Keeton coined the term and introduced the reasonable
expectations concept to the academic world. But Lachs used other contract
construction tools to appropriately find coverage and, in my view, hardly "tor-
tured" the policy language. Rather, Lachs took a comprehensive, context-sen-
sitive, eclectic approach to policy construction, an approach in which
policyholder expectations were a part of the analysis rather than a trump card
for the policyholder.
8
Unfortunately, Lachs has long been either overlooked or treated as some-
thing of a novelty case because of its subject matter - "vending machine" or
"self-service" flight insurance. On closer examination, Lachs provides not only
an interesting (if tragic) fact pattern but also illustrates with understated grace
the appropriate approach to resolving insurance coverage disputes with consid-
eration to questions of text, party intent, purpose, expectations, and public
policy.
legal academy, this trend also reflects the increasing focus upon insurance law by scholarly
commentators, including practitioners.
5 See, e.g., Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), cert
denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947) (court, in Learned Hand opinion, finds coverage under condi-
tional receipt issued pursuant to life insurance sale); Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 120
N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1918). Gaunt is typically characterized as a case that simply construed
ambiguous policy language against the insurer. On closer examination, Gaunt reflects use of
the reasonable expectations concept as a major pillar of the decision. See also Stempel,
supra note 3, at 189-94 (discussing cases from which Keeton's Rights at Variance article
drew its conclusions); Robert H. Jerry II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasona-
ble Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 31-32 (1988) (discussing Bird and other older, pre-
Keeton Rights at Variance article cases utilizing reasonable expectations concept).
6 118 N.E.2d 555 (N.Y. 1954), reh'g denied, 120 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1954).
7 See Keeton, supra note 1, at 970, 976.
8 The Lachs version of reasonable expectations does not fit neatly into the traditional classi-
fication, but is, if anything, a "weak" version of the approach, one that must first find some
significant uncertainty in the wording of the insurance policy before the court will consider
expectations as affecting the interpretation of the policy. See infra text accompanying notes
64-74 (discussing reasonable expectations doctrine in greater detail).
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From a distance of nearly fifty years, the Lachs case continues to provide
an example of the appropriate judicial approach to insurance coverage disputes
- one that looks to the whole package, including policy text, party intentions,
transaction purpose, party expectations, and public policy. At the same time,
Lachs also illustrates how fragile the position of such comprehensive and
enlightened adjudication can be. Judge Conway's majority opinion com-
manded only a 4-3 vote of the Court. Ironically, it was the highly regarded
Judge Fuld who with two others mistakenly but vigorously dissented. In a
twenty-first century faced with frequently difficult coverage disputes over pol-
lution, product liability, construction problems, e-commerce, computers, and
the respective rights and obligations of insurers and policyholders, Lachs
remains a case worth keeping in mind.
I. THE LACHS DECISION
In Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 9 the Court of Appeals,
New York's highest court, was required to determine whether benefits would
be paid on a "flight insurance" policy purchased by machine at the airport by a
passenger moments before she boarded a plane destined for a fatal crash. The
policy provided that it covered only flights on "scheduled" airlines. The poli-
cyholder died flying what the insurer considered a "non-scheduled" airline.
The case is relatively well-known as one of the handful of leading cases regard-
ing flight or vending machine insurance and is commonly cited in casebooks
and treatises.' 0
On December 16, 1951, New York resident Sadie Bernstein went to New-
ark Airport to take a flight to Miami, Florida. She happened upon a vending
machine that offered "AIRLINE TRIP INSURANCE" underwritten by Fidelity
& Casualty Company of New York. She bought a $25,000 policy for $25 in
premium, paid through deposit into the machine."l She named her daughter
(Marion Lachs, subsequently the plaintiff in the case) as the beneficiary. Bern-
stein later boarded the plane, which appears to have crashed almost immedi-
ately upon takeoff, killing the policyholder (and apparently all fifty-six
9 118 N.E.2d 555 (N.Y. 1954).
'o See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 29.3
(1994) (also suggesting that the Lachs majority tacitly applied the reasonable expectations
approach to resolve the case); ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 33,
at 148, n.41 (1987) and ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 32, at 192,
n.58 (2d ed. 1996). Professor Jerry, however, classifies the Lachs decision as holding that
the unscheduled airlines exclusion was "otherwise clear" but became ambiguous because the
flight insurance vending machine was near the ticket counter of an "nonscheduled" airline
(like me, Professor Jerry also failed to catch a typographical error in the first edition, citing
the case as "Lacks" rather than the correct "Lachs," a glitch carried over to the second
edition of Jerry's outstanding treatise).
The differing views of two insurance law professors highlights the fuzzy nature of this
part of insurance law. Regarding the actual views of the Lachs majority, Professor Jerry is
in my view incorrect. The Lachs majority saw the disputed term as facially ambiguous
while the dissenters thought it facially clear and enforceable. See infra notes 11-24.
" See Lachs, 118 N.E.2d at 556. The capitalization of "AIRLINE TRIP INSURANCE" is
the court's. According to the court, the words were "in letters ten times larger than any other
words on the machine and in prominent lighting." See id. at 557.
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passengers and crew on board).12 Later, her daughter sought to collect the
death benefit under the policy. The insurer denied coverage, taking the position
that the policy only applied to "scheduled" flights - those operated at regular
times by major airlines. According to the insurer, the flight Lachs took was
"nonscheduled" 
- operated irregularly by a non-major air service.
Unfortunately, the Lachs opinion, despite its many legal strengths, is thin
on factual description. Even the dissent, which argues that laypersons know the
difference between scheduled and nonscheduled flights, provides no detail as to
the plane flight and the carrier's operation. The reader is not told what type of
airplane was used in the fatal flight. Nor is the operator of the flight described.
The Miami Airlines flight was what we would now call a charter. It was large
enough that when it crashed, fifty-six people (including, of course, Bernstein)
perished. 3 The plane was not a small, "puddle-jumper" or crop-duster.14 In
other words, Bemstein boarded a charter flight in a reasonably large plane car-
rying other New Yorkers to Miami to escape the Northeastern winter or per-
haps to visit relatives during the holidays.' 5 In this ambiguous situation, at a
12 See id. at 556-57. "She later entered the plane after a delay, the reason for which is not
disclosed in the record, and in less than an hour was dead as the result of a crash." The court
is both melodramatic and cryptic. News accounts of the tragedy are scarce but it appears
that all on board were killed in a takeoff-related problem or difficulties experienced early in
the flight.
13 See Crash, Competition Hit Nonskeds, AVIATION WEEK, Dec. 24, 1951, at 54. Note that
this article headline refers to charter flights such as the Miami Airlines plane, as "nonskeds"
or nonscheduled airlines. However, the article was in Aviation Week, which suggests to me
that the term "nonsked" had a technical meaning even if a layperson like Bernstein had been
realistically able to read and analyze the flight insurance policy in question.
14 The plane in question was a "twin-engine Curtiss Commando." It had heater and brake
maintenance problems prior to the crash and was thought to have crashed due to breakout of
a fire after takeoff. See id. at 54.
At the time of the crash, there had been an ongoing debate about the relative safety of
scheduled and nonscheduled airlines. In 1951, there were 5.2 passenger fatalities per million
passenger miles for "nonskeds," which may have included small private planes as well as
charters, compared to 1.5 fatalities per million passenger miles for scheduled airlines. In
1950, the relative rates were 3.7 and 1.3, the difference largely owing to the Miami Airlines
crash and its many victims. Id. at 54. Although this difference supports the underwriting
rationale for insurers distinguishing the types of flights covered, it hardly excuses lack of
clarity in an insurance policy. Also, the risk differential is hardly dramatic. Even in a year
with a tragedy such as the Miami Airlines crash, the death rate from flying nonscheduled
airlines was far below the fatality rate for driving by automobile. And, it should be
remembered, the policy sold to Bernstein was not like ordinary automobile insurance applied
to airplanes. It was like auto insurance that provided coverage only for one round trip from
New York to Florida.
It appears that, in 1951, scheduled airlines primarily served business and official travel
(e.g., government, military) and that there was comparatively little recreational air travel
among the public at large. See id. at 54 (Civil Aeronautics Board had "urged the regular
airlines to go into the air travel mass market.").
All this may suggest that perhaps laypersons such as Bernstein appreciated the distinc-
tion between charters and noncharters, at least if the issue was consciously raised, a point the
dissent pressed in arguing that the terms scheduled and nonscheduled were clear. To me,
however, the most this shows is simply some ambiguity as to what the terms might mean if
read in an insurance policy.
15 Miami Airlines, the airline flown by Bernstein, may have been a super-charter carrier or
the functional equivalent of a major airline for that purpose. "Plaintiff claims that Miami
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time when air travel was still considered something of an adventure rather than
a commonplace event, Bernstein apparently decided that buying a bit of life
insurance covering the trip might be a good idea.
The vending machine was "situated in front of the Consolidated Air Ser-
vice counter" where the airline ticket was purchased.16 In return for inserting
the premium in the slot of the machine, an application was dispensed. The
vending machine was also decorated with "a well-illuminated display of air-
planes flying round and round, and in large characters appeared the words and
numerals '25 [dollars] For Each $5,000 Maximum $25,000.' "17 There was also
a large-lettered placard that stated ("in letters many times the size of the other
words" on the machine):' 8
"DOMESTIC"
AIRLINE TRIP INSURANCE
25 FOR EACH $5,000 MAXIMUM $25,00019
After this advertisement prominent on the face of the machine, the placard
set forth the more problematic language that became the focus of the dispute:
Covers first one-way flight shown on application (also return flight if round trip
airline ticket purchased) completed in 12 months within or between United States,
Alaska, Hawaii or Canada or between any point therein and any point in Mexico,
Bermuda or West Indies on any scheduled airline. Policy void outside limits. For
"international" coverage see airline agent."
20
1: This insurance shall apply only to such injuries sustained following the purchase
by or for the Insured of a transportation ticket from ... a Scheduled Airline...
during any portion of the first one way or round airline trip covered by such transpor-
tation ticket in consequence of: (a) boarding, riding as a passenger in, alighting from
or coming in contact with any aircraft operated on a regular or special or chartered
flight by a Civilian Scheduled Airline maintaining regular, published schedules and
licensed for interstate, intrastate or international transportation of passengers by the
Governmental Authority having jurisdiction over Civil Aviation ....
Airline, Inc. maintained regular, published schedules of fares and schedules showing passen-
ger mile rates and that it held itself out as maintaining regular schedules of flights and ticket
were sold for stated hours of departure and that it was licensed by the Civil Aeronautics
Board to carry passengers and freight with large aircraft in interstate, overseas, and foreign
air transportation. We think there is a question of fact presented [as to the status of Miami as
a "scheduled" airline, thereby triggering the principle that ambiguous language should be
construed against the insurer which drafted the contract.] See Lachs, 118 N.E.2d at 559. In
addition to Bernstein and the fifty-five other decedents, the plane carried former Secretary of
War and United States Court of Appeals Judge Robert Patterson. See Disasters: Last
Flight; Fighting Judge, TIME, Feb. 4, 1952, at 12.
16 See Lachs, 118 N.E.2d at 557. According to the court, the plaintiff "claims" this was the
machine's location. The location, however, does not appear to have been seriously disputed
by the court or the insurer. A full reading of the case suggests that the vending machine was
indeed close to the point where the passenger/policyholder finalized her ticket arrangements.
17 Id.




The application form asked the "applicant" for information about the air-
line trip but apparently did not ask for the name of the airline or the nature of
the flight. 2' After the application is inserted into the machine, the purchaser
received the policy, which the court described as follows:
The policy is approximately eleven inches in height and is printed on both sides -
thus there are twenty-two inches of printed matter. However, the purchaser does find
across the front of the policy in type many times larger than all the other printing on
the page and obliterating some words of the policy: "THIS POLICY IS LIMITED
TO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS READ IT CAREFULLY." There is also an envelope
in the machine to mail to the beneficiary for the insured is not expected to read the
policy on the plane. The envelope has printed on it: "AIRLINE TRIP
INSURANCE."
Plaintiff says that some but not all machines have a specimen policy attached and that
it has not been established that the machine from which decedent purchased her pol-
21 See id. Calling the purchaser of this sort of insurance an "applicant" is technically correct
perhaps but a bit of a misnomer. The insurer is not in a position to "reject" the applicant or
even to do any underwriting. Essentially, the vending machine becomes a cash-and-carry
operation (absent fraud, which gives the insurer another defense). Bernstein paid a premium
and received a policy covering travel with an "application" that does not even explore the
scheduled-nonscheduled distinction deemed so important by the insurer after it knew that the
plane had crashed and Bernstein had died.
The insurer is willing to essentially issue no questions asked coverage because there are
fewer problems of potential adverse selection or moral hazard. The passenger-policyholder
is unlikely to seek higher risk flights as a means of adding to the family assets. Neither is the
passenger with insurance more likely to exercise less care because of the presence of insur-
ance - by definition the flight is under the control of the pilot and others (including the
airport, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, etc.).
Consequently, the risk distribution of such insurance is quite good for the insurer, even
if it is forced to cover small, unscheduled flights. Unless there is a group of suicidal policy-
holders hellbent on taking a dangerous flight or making the flight more dangerous (which is
farfetched for flights of this size, even in the wake of the September 11t' terrorist attacks),
the insurer is sure to enjoy the benefit of large numbers and the law of averages in spreading
the risk.
Furthermore, the premium charged for the coverage that lasts only a few hours is very
high. For example, Bernstein paid $1 per $1,000 of life insurance "protection" that was
limited to at most a few hours of flying to Miami and back. A typical life insurance policy
costs between $1 and $4 per thousand for an entire year of coverage for untimely death
resulting from any non-excluded cause. Also, the flight insurance policy has a relatively low
maximum face value. It is hard to have overinsurance absent the taking out of several poli-
cies, which the insurer can prohibit. As long as the insurer sells enough of these policies, the
line is sure to be profitable.
That said, I need to put in a word on the side of the insurer and what the insurer was
probably trying to do in setting forth the "scheduled-nonscheduled" flight distinction. In a
truly private plane setting, the issues of risk distribution, adverse selection, and moral hazard
can become less advantageous for the insurer. A CEO trying to make a big meeting or a
lawyer running late for a court date may hound a private pilot into flying when conditions
are too rough (although this, too, is limited by the need to get flight clearance from the
airport). A sociable group of passengers and pilots may be more tempted to depart from safe
flight practices: consider the notorious crashes of private planes carrying popular music
stars where there have at least been concerns that drug use on the plane extended to pilots.
That, of course, is why it is important to me to know whether Bernstein flew her own
private plane or was simply on a charter or minor airline flight to Miami. If it was the latter,
which it appears to be when one reads the Lachs opinion's connotative meaning, Bernstein's
flight presented no realistically problematic risk for the insurer.
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icy had a specimen attached. Be that as it may, the defendant has presented as an
exhibit a specimen policy and the words quoted (supra): "THIS POLICY IS LIM-
ITED TO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS READ IT CAREFULLY" obliterate the words:
"Civilian Scheduled Airline" in the coverage clause so that they cannot be read." 22
The court decided in favor of the policyholder primarily on the ground that
the terms "scheduled" and "non-scheduled" were unclear to the average lay
passenger purchasing the policy and that the contra proferentem rule of con-
struction (ambiguities in a contract are construed against the drafter, a rule of
thumb so commonly invoked for insurance cases that many courts and com-
mentators, including me, no longer italicize despite the Latin terminology)
compelled a finding for the policyholder. Attempting to avoid the contra
proferentem doctrine, the insurer introduced what its judicial supporters
described as
a veritable mountain of material - contained in statute and regulations, in opinions
and reports, in newspapers and magazines - to demonstrate that the term "scheduled
airline" has gained a wide and general currency, and that it is a term of clear and
precise meaning, which has become part and parcel of the ordinary person's every-
day vocabulary. Defined by any standard and from any point of view, and com-
pressed into a sentence, it simply and solely denotes a common carrier permitted to
operate, or to hold out to the public that it operates, one or more airplanes between
designated points regularly, or with a reasonable degree of regularity, in accordance
with a previously announced schedule.
2 3
The majority viewed this mountain of evidence as topography of ambigu-
ity rather than certainty:
The attempt of defendant to establish that the term "Civilian Scheduled Airline" has a
clear and definite meaning has caused it to bring forward and present an enormous
amount of proof extrinsic to the policy including a statute, regulations, newspaper
and magazine articles, etc. By this mountain of work it seems to us that defendant
has established that "Civilian Scheduled Airline" is not at all free from ambiguity and
vagueness - if it were not so the contract of insurance itself would disclose within its
four comers the intent of the parties entering into it.
24
Although New York is not generally regarded as a state that follows the
reasonable expectations doctrine, Lachs can be seen as a reasonable expecta-
tions case as well as an ambiguity case. For example, the court stressed that the
insurer had placed the flight insurance vending machine near the ticket counter
for the "non-scheduled" airline. Regardless of the purported prohibition on
coverage for these flights, the court suggested that the policyholder had reason-
ably assumed she was covered under the policy when she flew from an airline
so close to the insurer's vending machine. In reaching this decision, the court
applied the sort of holistic approach to contract construction that is a significant
underpinning of both the reasonable expectations doctrine and modem contract
interpretation.
We have never departed from our statement in Kenyon v. Knight Templar & Masonic
Mut. Aid Assn.: "It may be preliminarily observed that, as a general rule, the con-
struction of a written instrument is a question of law for the court to determine, but
22 See id.
23 Id. at 561 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 560.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
when the language employed is not free from ambiguity, or when it is equivocal and
its interpretation depends upon the sense in which the words were used, in view of
the subject to which they relate, the relation of the parties and the surrounding cir-
cumstances properly applicable to it, the intent of the parties becomes a matter of
inquiry, and the interpretation of the language used by them is a mixed question of
law and fact." Was the decedent entitled to believe that she had purchased "AIR-
LINE TRIP INSURANCE" through a policy "LIMITED TO AIRCRAFI ACCI-
DENTS"? It seems to us that a jury could find that when decedent purchased her
policy on an application for "AIRLINE TRIP INSURANCE" from a machine having
in prominent lighting those same three words, before obtaining her ticket from a
counter in front of which the machine stood, she was covered on her flight, since the
minds of the decedent and the company had met on that basis. In other words, since
defendant put one of its automatic vending machines in front of the ticket counter of
the Consolidated Air Service, which, according to an affidavit submitted by defen-
dant "was utilized by all non-scheduled airlines operating out of the Newark Airport,
as a processing point for their passengers, and before any passenger on a non-sched-
uled airline could receive his ticket he was required to present his 'exchange order' at
said counter" we think a jury might find that the defendant was inviting those passen-
gers to insure themselves by its "AIRLINE TRIP INSURANCE. ' 25
In particular, the court noted that the insurer through the scheduled-non-
scheduled airline defense to coverage was using an argument that "draws the
line of construction very finely" and noted that according to the policyholder's
side of the story, her flight qualified as a scheduled airline by any reasonable
definition of the term.26 Under these circumstances, the court found that a
number of factors pointed to a construction in favor of coverage.
The precise holding of the court was only that the insurer could not prevail
on summary judgment and that the beneficiary could proceed to jury trial. The
practical effect of the holding was to rule against the insurer as to contract
meaning by invoking a comprehensive approach to contract construction that
involved policy language, party intent, purpose of the insuring arrangement,
estoppel, reasonable expectations, and public policy.
27
The dissent staked out a much more textualist position, invoking the now
familiar nye-on-to-hackneyed reference to Alice in Wonderland, and Humpty
Dumpty's famous boast that when he uses a word, it "means just what I choose
it to mean."28 The dissent intended this to be a slap at the majority, which in
the dissent's view had adopted an idiosyncratic view of the terms "scheduled"
and "non-scheduled." But one might as easily read the invocation of Lewis
Carroll as a jab at the insurance company, which could have defined the term in
the policy but did not and which could have alerted prospective customers to
this limitation of coverage but did not.
25 Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted; italics in original).
26 Id. at 559.
27 Id. at 558-60. The Lachs majority opinion thus provided the intellectual grounding for
the perhaps more well-known Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 377 P.2d 284 (Cal. 1962),
which found coverage under similar circumstances and held that coverage-limiting language
such as the restriction of coverage to civilian scheduled flights must be "conspicuous, plain,
and clear" to be enforceable. Steven also can be read as more expressly embracing the
reasonable expectations concept.
28 Lachs, 118 N.E.2d at 560 (Fuld, J. dissenting).
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The dissent makes at least two fundamental errors. First, it adopts the
belief that those who do not read the term "civilian scheduled airline" in the
same manner as does the insurer (after the fact, when it knows it has a claim)
are simply not reasonable people reading English. In effect, the dissent is argu-
ing for a reasonable expectations doctrine protecting insurers.2 9
Alternatively, the dissent silently argues a position that turns contract law
principles on their head. It seeks a reverse contra proferentem where unclear
language is construed in favor of the contract drafter and it seeks to accord
insurance policy language a highly technical meaning rather than the ordinary
meaning applicable to the laypersons who purchase such policies.31 It seems to
attach no consequence at all to the insurer's failure to define a term it later
argued was key to the coverage.3 '
The second, and perhaps more grievous error of the dissent is to focus
exclusively, even myopically on text. Unlike the majority, the dissent has no
appreciation of the nontextual factors surrounding the sale of the life insurance
product: the policy was advertised through a vending machine without a
learned agent intermediary; the vending machine was placed in an area where
nonscheduled airlines regularly flew; the premium charged was very high for
limited coverage; the need to protect the public from potentially deceptive prac-
tices; and, of course, the policyholder's perspective, understanding, and expec-
tations. All these things are ignored by the dissent in favor of a preferred but
by no means obvious reading of the text.32
29 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Peril and Fortuity in Property and Liability Insurance, 36
TORT & INS. L.J. 777 (2001) (suggesting that courts invoking concepts of risk assumed may
tacitly create unwritten rules favoring insurers and would render better decisions focusing on
the insurance contract itself). The Lachs dissent does, of course, focus on contract language.
But it does so with an implicit, overly generous regard for the insurer's desire to limit its risk
exposure to only "civilian scheduled airlines" even though it established a marketing system
that was sure to take money from those flying other airlines in the terminal. See Lachs, 118
N.E.2d at 560-64 (Fuld, J. dissenting).
30 See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV.
531, 567-69 (1996) (concluding that rule of construing policy terms against insurer/drafter
deservedly is key foundation of proper judicial approach to insurance policy construction
because it provides a relatively simple and fair method of rendering apt decisions in light of
the operation of insurance and contracting markets).
31 See Abraham, supra note 29, at 778-79 (noting that enforcement of contra proferentem
maxim against insurers serves the purpose of forcing insurer/contract drafter to provide
greater information). In the context of airport vending machine insurance, however, the
forcing of a clear policy definition is far less likely to reach the purchaser. In other
instances, such as the purchase of a commercial liability policy by a business, the informa-
tion-forcing value of the contra preferentem default rule is likely to be significant.
32 In this regard, the Lachs dissent provided the intellectual pedigree for the leading case
finding no coverage under similar circumstances. See Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Russell,
402 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 973 (1969) (applying Kansas law) (no
coverage for decedent policyholder who purchased flight insurance with duration of four
days but was forced to delay return, dying in crash twelve hours after expiration of the
policy). However, Russell is more defensible than the Lachs dissent. Unlike the term "civil-
ian scheduled airline," the time limit in a policy is a term capable of clear lay understanding.
If a court is willing to overlook the hurried point-of-sale marketing of airline flight insur-
ance, a court could justifiably place the risk of delayed travel on the policyholder as part of
the insurance "bargain."
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Rather than think about these factors, the dissent invokes the technical
case law of airline regulation - a factor at least as removed from the insuring
transaction as the nontextual considerations invoked by the majority. Yet the
dissent accuses the majority of roving too far from the policy in making its
decision.
The dissent's reverence for its reading of the text is particularly odd under
the circumstances of the sale. Even if Sadie Bernstein had shared the insurer's
view of the meaning of "civilian scheduled airline," she had no realistic oppor-
tunity to read the policy. Few airline passengers arrive at the terminal with
sufficient time on their hands to read and study a specimen policy dangling
from a vending machine. As a practical matter, she bought a prepackaged
product she assumed covered her on any flight she took out of the airport. She
paid her money first and then received her goods, much like a buyer in any
over-the-counter retail transaction. But Bernstein had no salesperson with
whom she could talk. Even a supermarket shopper has more opportunity to
seek guidance and more opportunity to inspect the goods before purchase. The
dissent remained indifferent to these factors.
H. LACHS AND THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Because Lachs involved the unusual circumstances of vending machine
insurance and flight insurance, both non-mainstream forms of marketing and
coverage, there is a tendency to see Lachs as simply an interesting case in an
odd subset of insurance law.3 3 As I hope the preceding discussion of the case
has shown, Lachs is a good case for illustrating the range of considerations
applicable in any insurance coverage dispute and for illustrating the differing
judicial approaches to these disputes. There may also be a temptation to
explain Lachs as result-oriented because of its unusual circumstances and the
understandable sympathy a court might have for the victim of an airline disaster
and her family. But on closer examination, the approach of the Lachs majority
reflects quite well the overall approach to insurance disputes taken by courts, at
least when courts are performing at their best.
However, this approach can still be criticized in view of the high premiums charged and
limited coverage offered. As a matter of unconscionability and public policy, coverage
under such a flight policy should not be cut off by the relatively minor extension of the time
limit set forth in the policy so long as the policyholder did not make major changes in travel
plans that did not increase the insurer's risks. For example, what if Russell's plane crashed
at the completion of the return flight only twenty minutes after expiration of the policy?
Under these circumstances, the insurer's risk is not greatly increased - it is still well paid for
limited coverage - while the consequences of such strict construction can be devastating for
the beneficiary. Of course, the passenger is foolish if flight insurance is all that he or she has
provided for his or her dependents in the event of death, opening the question of whether the
flight insurance product should be more heavily regulated or banned altogether - but that's a
regulatory topic for another day.
33 Certainly, I have fallen prey to this tendency. See STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 3-123-6
(discussing the vending machine insurance cases as their own universe). See also ROBERT
H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW §32 (2d ed. 1996) (taking the same
approach).
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A. General Ground Rules of Contract and Insurance Coverage
New York has the standard contract law ground rules of most American
jurisdictions. Contracts are to be interpreted consistently with the intent of the
contracting parties.34 Contracts are to be interpreted to fulfill their purpose.35
The language of the contract is normally the best indication of the intent of the
parties, the purpose of the contract, and the expectations of the parties. Conse-
quently, when contract text is clear and unambiguous and does not lead to
absurd results, courts generally enforce the contract according to its text, irre-
spective of the bargaining power of the parties or whether the contract is one of
adhesion.3 6 In addition, New York, like other American states, will not enforce
contracts that are illegal under its substantive law or that violate state public
policy.
37
When contract text is unclear (either because it is vague or ambiguous),
courts are to construe the contract in order to reasonably uphold the intent of
the parties and the purpose of the contract. 38 The contract is intended to be
read as a whole, and the courts attempt to give effect to all contract provisions
if that is possible without violating other contract construction precepts.39
Where contract text is unclear or would lead to unacceptable results if literally
applied, courts look to extrinsic evidence and the function the contract is
intended to serve.4 ° In apt cases, courts will review a wide variety of extrinsic
34 See Record Club of Am., Inc. v. United Artists Records, Inc., 890 F.2d 1264, 1267 (2d
Cir. 1989) (applying New York law as are all federal appellate cases in this article unless
otherwise indicated); Kenevan v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 791 F. Supp. 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1373-74 (E.D.N.Y.
1988); W.W.W. Assocs. Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990).
35 See Newmont Mines, Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127, 136-37 (2d Cir. 1986);
Lavanant v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 595 N.E.2d 819, 822 (1992); Ace Wire & Cable
Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 N.E.2d 761,764 (N.Y. 1983).
36 See United States v. 0.35 Of An Acre Of Land, More Or Less, Situated In Westchester
County, State of N.Y., 706 F. Supp. 1064, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Slatt v. Slatt, 477 N.E.2d
1099, 1100 (N.Y. 1985); Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282. See Charles
C. Marvel, Annotation, Division of Opinion Among Judges on Same Court or Among Other
Courts or Jurisdictions Considering Same Question, As Evidence That Particular Clause of
Insurance Policy is Ambiguous, 4 A.L.R.4th 1246 (1981).
37 See Drutman Realty Co., Ltd P'ship v. Jindo Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1093, 1100-01
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int'l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504, 509
(N.Y. 1994); Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 86 A.D.2d 459 (N.Y. 1982). For example, even a clear
exculpatory clause will not apply to protect a party from willful or grossly negligent acts.
See Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 448 N.E.2d 413, 416 (N.Y. 1983).
38 See McGrail v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 55 N.E.2d 483, 486 (N.Y.
1944).
39 See Cruden v. Bank of N.Y., 957 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1992); Chase v. Columbia Nat'l
Corp., 832 F. Supp. 654, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d at 642 (N.Y.
1990); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 7.8-7.14 (3d ed. 1999). See also Westches-
ter Resco Co., L.P. v. New England Reinsurance Corp., 648 F. Supp. 842, 846 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd, 818 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying New York law); Employers Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 384 N.E.2d 668 (N.Y. 1978) (entire contract to
be construed may include binder, application, or other documents in addition to four corners
of the policy per se).
40 See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1187 (2d Cir.
1995) (assessing case according to both New York and Texas law, which were found to be
equivalent on most contested issues); Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins.
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evidence, including witness testimony (on the stand or by affidavit), statements
by the parties or their agents, contract documents, correspondence, notes,
insurer records, the customary use of terms in the trade, the course of dealing
between the parties, the negotiation history of the instrument, and the drafting
history of the contract, as well as the function and nature of the contract in light
of the context and surrounding circumstances affecting the contract. Applica-
ble law and public policy may also be considered.
When applying the literal language of a contract would create an absurd
result or an outcome that cannot reasonably have reflected the parties' contem-
plation, language must be given its reasonable rather than literal application.4"
Even clear contract text that does not lead to an absurd result may not be
enforced strictly where the text is clearly contradicted by other evidence of
intended meaning or where consideration of nontextual matter is necessary to
prevent a fraud or intentional forfeiture.42
Where a contract term is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence will be heard by
the court to interpret, explain, or amplify the term in dispute, and perhaps even
to refine it.43 A word, term, provision, or clause of a contract is ambiguous
when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation." Ordinarily,
courts make most of their determinations regarding whether the relevant words
are ambiguous by examining the words themselves in isolation, giving words
their "plain, ordinary, popular and non-technical sense."45 Put another way,
contractual language can be said to be clear or unambiguous only if "it has
definite and precise meaning unattended by danger of misconception in purport
of the contract itself and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for
difference of opinion."4 6 As part of the process of interpreting a disputed con-
tract, however, courts will examine the entire contract text and the context of
the transaction.
After this analytic exercise, a term that is seemingly ambiguous may
become clarified or a competing construction may become viewed as unreason-
able. In addition, a term that is seemingly clear standing alone may become
viewed as ambiguous after other provisions of the contract and the entire trans-
Co., 47 F.3d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1995); Kimmins Indus. Serv. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
748 F.2d 760, 765 (2d Cir. 1984).
41 See Burger King Corp. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 893 F.2d 525, 529 (2d Cir. 1990); Reape
v. N.Y. News, Inc., 504 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (App. Div. 1986).
42 See Bersani v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd., 330 N.E.2d 68, 70 (N.Y.
1975); Katzman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1955); Whipple v. Brown
Bros. Co., 121 N.E. 748, 751 (N.Y. 1919).
43 See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1187 (2d Cir.
1995); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gen. Reinsurance Corp., 949 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1991);
Chimart Assocs. v. Paul, 489 N.E.2d 231, 234 (N.Y. 1986); Brady v. Nally, 45 N.E. 547,
548 (N.Y. 1896).
4 See U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 949 F.2d at 572; Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 840
(2d Cir. 1981).
41 See Rocon Mfg., Inc. v. Ferraro Co., 605 N.Y.S.2d 591, 592 (App. Div. 1993). But see
Saunders v. Agric. Ins. Co. of Watertown, 60 N.E. 635 (N.Y. 1901) (insured property
described as "barn" ambiguous given contracting history and context of loss).
46 See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Amerford Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 458, 461 (2d Cir.
1994) (quoting Hunt Ltd. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 889 F.2d 1274, 1277 (2d Cir.
1989)); Seiden Assocs., Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1992).
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action are reviewed.47 As one court put the matter, "clarity in a contract is a
property of the correspondence between the contract and the things or activities
that it regulates, and not just the semantic surface. 48
When a court must construe an ambiguous or unclear contract provision
and resort to extrinsic evidence does not resolve the question, the term in dis-
pute is construed against the drafter of the contract. This is the well-known
contra proferentem rule discussed in the Lachs case and is a staple of New
York's general contract law as well as its insurance contract law. 4 9 Lack of
clarity of meaning typically arises from a few recurring types of situations. For
example, one might distinguish between vagueness and ambiguity. Most
American contract and insurance scholars would agree that a term is vague
when it is generally understandable but becomes imprecise when applied in
relatively unusual situations.50
If the text of the primary disputed provision of a contract (including, of
course, an insurance policy) has several apt meanings, application of the term
can become unclear in a particular situation. This constitutes what is com-
monly referred to as "ambiguity of term" - words that themselves admit of
more than one reasonable meaning. For example, a contract may refer to the
ship "Peerless," a term that in a famous contract case literally applied to two
different ships.51
If the text in dispute is unclear because of the manner in which terms are
used, the contract exhibits "syntactical" ambiguity. For example, an insurance
policy might exclude expense incurred due to any "disease of organs of the
body not common to both sexes." Under this language, it is textually unclear
whether it is the disease that must occur in only one gender in order to trigger
the exclusionary language or whether it is sufficient that the bodily organ be
distinctly male or female to exclude coverage of even diseases occurring in
4 See Kenevan v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 791 F. Supp. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
48 See AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Posner, J.) (applying Illinois law).
'9 See Record Club of Am., Inc. v. United Artists Records, Inc., 890 F.2d 1264, 1271 (2d
Cir. 1989); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Tri Town
Antlers Found., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 559 N.E.2d 1283 (N.Y. 1990).
so See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999); E. Allan Farnsworth, Meaning in
the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967). For example, all would agree that an acci-
dent is a covered "occurrence" under the typical American automobile policy. But if a car
spinning on slippery pavement hits three cars, it is textually unclear whether there has been
one occurrence or three and a controversy regarding coverage limits of "$20,000 per occur-
rence" cannot be resolved by focus on contract text alone. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDER-
STANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25A, at 94 (1987), from which this illustration is taken and
which cites cases taking opposing views on the matter. Compare Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Rawls, 404 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1968) (two occurrences), with Olsen v. Moore, 202 N.W.2d
236 (Wis. 1972) (one occurrence).
51 See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Excheq. 1864). The
Raffles v. Wichelhaus court reached the sensible conclusion that neither party was bound by
the other's concept of which "Peerless" vessel would carry the shipments. In determining
which of two equally plausible meanings of "Peerless" applied, a court would decide based
on the intent and expectations of the parties if extrinsic evidence revealed those intentions or
expectations. If no such basis for decision were available, the contract would fail under
classic contract law because of mutual mistake. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.9, at 463
(3d ed. 1990).
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both men and women. Thus, it is textually unclear whether a policyholder is
covered for health care costs occasioned by a tumor of the uterus since a tumor
can occur in any male or female organ but the specific tumor at issue in the
coverage dispute occurred in an organ found only in women. As a prominent
insurance scholar observed "[t]he words of the policy are relatively precise; the
problem is one of syntax."
52
Insurance policies are contracts and insurance law is to a large degree a
subspecies of contract law. The rules established for the construction and inter-
pretation of written contracts apply to insurance policies.53 The better reasoned
decisions recognize, however, that contract interpretation will often be affected
by the manner in which insurance policies differ from other contracts. Apart
from the obviously more active government intervention affecting insurance
than exists for other contracts,
[T]he distinctive nature of insurance contracts and refinements in the parts and
clauses thereof have given rise to certain standards and rules which, even if not
entirely limited in their application to the construction of insurance contracts are of
little practical significance apart from such contracts. Among these special rules are
the rules of liberal construction in favor of the insured, the construction against
exceptions and limitations, and the construction against forfeitures.
5 4
New York law provides that interpretation of insurance policies as con-
tracts must fulfill the intent and purpose of the transaction.55 The notion that
insurers have somewhat different obligations to their customers than do other
merchants is well established and does not constitute a slanted or uneven
approach to construing insurance policies. Rather, recognition of the special
responsibilities of insurers simply provides the context in which basic contract
52 See JERRY, supra note 50, § 25A, at 95 (1987). Professor Jerry draws this example from
Professor Farnsworth's Meaning in the Law of Contracts, supra note 50, which borrowed it
from an actual case: Business Men's Assurance Ass'n v. Read, 48 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932) (coverage found for policyholder). Where one contract provision is seemingly
clear but is in conflict with another policy provision, there exists ambiguity of organization
in the policy. This ambiguity of organization also occurs where the policy contains two or
more terms seemingly clear in isolation but in apparent conflict when juxtaposed. For exam-
ple, a policy subject to the law of State X may in one section state that it does not provide
coverage for reckless or intentional behavior but in another section state that it covers puni-
tive damage awards, which in State X may be awarded upon a showing of recklessness. The
provisions of the policy, clear in isolation, are in apparent conflict over whether coverage
exists for a policyholder against whom a judgment is entered for punitive damages arising
out of reckless conduct.
53 See Skandia Am. Reinsurance Corp. v. Schenck, 441 F. Supp. 715, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(noting that insurance policies, like other contracts, may be subject to different treatment
when they are contracts of adhesion); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins.
Co., 168 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1929).
54 See 69 NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE 2D INSURANCE § 692, at 80 (1988) (citations omitted).
51 See Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir.
1995); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1993) ("practical" con-
struction must be given where insurance policy text is unclear). The distinction between
insurance policies and "ordinary" contracts is at the margin appreciated by even laypersons,
a point pithily made in a New York Times financial column: "Unlike other corporations,
whose first loyalty is to their owners, or shareholders, insurance companies have long been
regulated under the philosophy that their primary obligation is to policyholders." Michael
Quint, Market Place: Who Would Win in a Split-Up Cigna? It Depends Who is Asked, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1995, at D8.
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law is applied to adjudicate insurance controversies. Although the insurer-poli-
cyholder relationship is not technically a fiduciary relationship, it has been
described as "fiduciary in nature" in both New York and other American juris-
dictions.56 Breach of the insurer's duties to the policyholder can give rise to
the tort claim of bad faith and a resulting judgment may include exemplary
damages. Although the insurer-policyholder relationship is largely one of con-
tract under New York law, special traits of the relationship are important to the
courts' adjudication of insurance disputes and give rise to particular rights and
responsibilities on the part of both insurers and policyholders.57
In difficult cases, however, courts take cognizance of the nature of insur-
ance, its function in a modem industrial society, its relation to the American
tort system of personal injury compensation, the degree to which risk-spreading
contributes to business and consumer welfare, the context in which the insur-
ance policy is issued, and the reasonable expectations of the policyholder.58
New York law, like that of other American jurisdictions, recognizes that
estoppel principles may affect insurance coverage questions. New York recog-
nizes the concepts of both "equitable estoppel," a situation in which the insurer,
by virtue of inequitable conduct toward its policyholder, is deemed to be
stripped of a coverage defense that would otherwise be available to it under the
policy, 59 and promissory estoppel or contract by detrimental reliance.' Where
56 See Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., 371 N.Y.S.2d 927, 941 (Colo. 1975) ("there is
authority elsewhere declaring the relationship to be of a fiduciary nature, akin to that of
principal and agent. Whatever the relationship, there is an obligation of full disclosure and
extreme good faith by the insurer in its dealings with its insured.").
57 See Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 285 N.E.2d 849, 858 (N.Y. 1972) ("doctrine
that a liability insurer owes a duty of good faith to protect its insured, including the good
faith consideration of opportunities to settle, because of its exclusive control in the manage-
ment of claims has deep roots in New York") (Breitel, J., dissenting). See also Rocanova v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 634 N.E.2d 940, 945 (N.Y. 1994) (under New York law, all
contracts carry with them an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; although puni-
tive damages are not available against insurer for mere breach of contract, independent tort
or breach of legal duty of fair dealing may give rise to exemplary damages).
58 See Ace Wire & Cable Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 N.E.2d 761 (N.Y. 1983); Tri
Town Antlers Found., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 550 N.Y.S.2d 953 (App. Div. 1990).
Little v. Blue Cross of W. N.Y., Inc., 424 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555-56 (App. Div. 1980), summa-
rizes New York law well on this point:
[T]he terms of a contract as a whole must be examined in determining the intent of the parties,
and where the meaning of a policy of insurance is in doubt or is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation, all ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the policyholder and against
the company which issued the policy; the reasonable expectation of the insured, from his reading
of the policy, must control.
See also 69 NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE 2D INSURANCE § 706, at 100 (1988):
The meaning of coverage and exclusion provisions of a liability insurance policy is to
be resolved in the light of the reasonable expectation and purpose of an ordinary business-
man in making the contract of insurance. If an insurance company desires to limit its liabil-
ity in a drastic manner it must express the limitation in language that will reasonably convey
its meaning to an intelligent layman or person of ordinary business intelligence.
" See Triple Cities Constr. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 151 N.E.2d 856 (N.Y. 1958); Tel-Tru Mfg.
Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 456 N.Y.S.2d 287 (App. Div. 1982); NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE 2D
INSURANCE § 1238 (1988). For example, if the policy text clearly provided that a proof-of-
loss form must be submitted within sixty days of the loss but the adjuster instructed the
policyholder to "take as much time as you need; 90 days, whatever," the insurer would be
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one party reasonably relies to its detriment upon the representations of another,
the representing party is bound and a contract exists to the extent of the reli-
ance. New York courts recognize and apply the doctrine of waiver as well as
both equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel to appropriate insurance cov-
erage cases. Waiver results when the insurer has (either through express state-
ments or conduct tantamount to statements) knowingly and voluntarily
relinquished a right it would have pursuant to the policy.6
New York, like other jurisdictions, requires that the policyholder bear the
burden of persuasion to show that a given loss falls within the scope of the
policy coverage. Once that initial burden has been satisfied, it is the insurer's
burden of persuasion to show the applicability of any asserted exclusion in the
policy. Courts usually take a functional view of exclusions, finding that any
policy provision that tends to defeat coverage is an "exclusion," even if not
denominated as such on the face of the policy.62 For example, New York
courts have treated the "expected or intended" language found in most liability
policies as an exclusion even though these words are ordinarily found in the
insuring agreement itself or the definitions section of the policy.6 3
All of these "hornbook" principles of insurance law are perfectly consis-
tent with the Lachs decision.' Unfortunately, Lachs has unfairly been charac-
terized as a decisional oddity prompted by an unusual situation and decided in
contravention of clear contract language.65 Upon closer examination, Lachs, to
equitably estopped from rigidly enforcing the sixty-day proof-of-loss time limit. Unfair con-
duct by the insurer that operates to prejudice the policyholder will estop the insurer from
invoking provisions of the policy affected by the unfair conduct.
I See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); I & I Holding Corp.
v. Gainsburg, 12 N.E.2d 532 (N.Y. 1938); Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua County
Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). Indeed, one of America's most famous
promissory estoppel cases (reprinted in several casebooks and discussed at length in virtually
every major treatise) stems from New York law. See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y.
1891) (nephew who refrains from "drinking liquor, using tobacco, swearing and playing
cards or billiards for money" until age twenty-one in reliance on payment promised by uncle
entitled to funds). See also Spiegel v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 160 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1959)
(policyholder was awarded coverage sought when court treated the coverage in question as
part of an expanded remedy under the policy in force rather than as the remedy provided by
a new contract created via promissory estoppel).
61 See Clark v. West, 86 N.E. I (N.Y. 1908); Robertson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 88 N.Y. 541
(1882).
62 See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1995)
("under New York law, the exclusionary effect of policy language, not its placement, con-
trols allocation of the burden of proof"); Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 476 N.E.2d 272
(N.Y. 1984); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 477 N.Y.S.2d 657, 660
(App. Div. 1984) ("It is the insurer which [sic] has the burden of proof to establish that a
claim is encompassed by an exclusion in a policy ... and any limitation in coverage must be
described in clear and explicit language"), aff'd, 478 N.E.2d 1305 (N.Y. 1985).
63 See City of Johnstown, N.Y. v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989);
Town of Moreau v. Orkin Exterminating Co. Inc., 568 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 1991).
64 See supra text accompanying notes 8-26 (describing Lachs decision and its
methodology).
65 See STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES, supra note 4, §3.18 (describing
Lachs as case that found for policyholder despite clear language regarding no coverage for
"unscheduled" airlines); Roger Henderson, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine After Two
Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 836-37 (1990) (same). See also Leon Wein, Maladjusted
[Vol. 2:319
Summer 2002] LACHS v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF N.Y.
a large extent, encompasses and vindicates basic contract construction princi-
ples and prevailing insurance law norms. In particular, as the discussion of the
case reflects, it is by no means crystal clear that the term "civilian scheduled
airline" meant that Sadie Bernstein's fateful Miami Airlines flight was uncov-
ered. If nothing else, then, the grundnorm of insurance law that insurers bear
the burden to show the applicability of exclusionary language would constitute
sufficient grounds for the Lachs holding.
B. Lachs and Reasonable Expectations Analysis
But even if one is persuaded that the term "civilian scheduled airline" has
the clear meaning proferred by the insurer, Lachs continues to look rightly
decided, perhaps more today than when it was rendered. Many American cases
have specifically adopted a "reasonable expectations" doctrine for application
to insurance coverage disputes.66 Although courts have been doing this prior to
Lachs, reasonable expectations analysis has been referred to as a doctrine with
a name during only the past thirty years since the publication of Keeton's
famous Rights at Variance article.67 Depending on who is counting, when one
counts, and how one counts, the reasonable expectations "doctrine" can be said
to have been accepted in one-third to one-half of the states.
The reasonable expectations "doctrine" in its "pure" form is most suc-
cinctly summarized by Keeton's phrase that under the doctrine, coverage in a
disputed case may be found to exist where the policyholder held objectively
reasonable expectations of coverage even if painstaking study of the policy
language would have negated those expectations. New York is commonly
viewed as perhaps the most prominent American jurisdiction with a high court
that has never expressly embraced the Keeton doctrine in this formula. 68 How-
ever, federal courts applying New York law and intermediate New York appel-
late cases have endorsed the reasonable expectations doctrine in essentially
"pure" form where policyholder expectations can overcome even clear and rea-
sonable policy language negating coverage.69 One treatise has even concluded,
apparently without reservation, that New York has adopted the Keeton reasona-
ble expectations doctrine.7 ° New York courts indeed place a good deal of
Contrivances and Clumsy Automation: A Jurisprudential Investigation, 9 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 375 (1996); Leon Wein, The Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: Toward an Auto-
mation Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103 (1992) (both times describing Lachs deci-
sion as prompted by judicial distrust of machines).
6 See STEMPEL, supra note 4, § 4.09 (summarizing adoption of doctrine in approximately
one-third to one-half the states).
67 See Keeton, supra note 1.
68 See Henderson, supra note 65, at 836-37 n.74 ("New York Court of Appeals has never
embraced the doctrine as articulated by Professor Keeton.").
I See, e.g., Fried v. N. River Ins. Co., 710 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir. 1983); Bd. of Educ., Yon-
kers City Sch. Dist. v. CNA Ins. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1495 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 14
(2d Cir. 1988); Champion Int'l Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 400 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
aff'd, 546 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977), Atl. Cement Co., Inc.
v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 459 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1983), affd, 471 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1984); IQ
Originals, Inc. v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 447 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1982), aff'd, 444 N.E.2d
1004 (N.Y. 1982); Riordan v. Auto Club of N.Y., Inc., 422 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1979).
70 See BARRY R. OSTRANGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVER-
AGE DisPuTEs § 1.03[b] (10th ed. 2000).
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weight upon the policyholder's expectations regarding the policy in question
even when not applying a reasonable expectations doctrine as such.7 1
Keeton summarized his assessment in the now-famous words:
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regard-
ing the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of
the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.
72
When courts apply "pure" reasonable expectations theory, the court man-
dates coverage consistent with the policyholder's expectations even if relatively
clear policy language is to the contrary.73
Lachs clearly is considering the reasonable expectations of the policy-
holder who purchased the flight insurance at issue in the case. A more difficult
question is whether Lachs was using a "strong" form of the Keeton reasonable
expectations approach (one that found coverage even though the policy lan-
guage was clear) or a moderate-to-weak version of the approach (one that con-
sidered the policyholder's expectations in order to determine the construction to
give to unclear policy text). After having read Lachs intermittently over the
years and reading it with some renewed vigor for this Symposium, I am quite
certain that the court was using only a mild form of the reasonable expectations
approach. Lachs in large part rested on context and the purpose of the insuring
agreement as well as the difficult policy language and the principle of contra
proferentem.
In Lachs, the policyholder's expectations did not overbear clear text or
other clear indicia of intent. Rather, policyholder expectations helped to
resolve the controversy as to the meaning of the legal policy because this datum
fit so well with other indicia of contract meaning. This view of Lachs is also
quite consistent with decades of New York jurisprudence, in which New York
courts have frequently resolved insurance coverage disputes by using policy-
holder (and insurer) expectations as a factor for decision but have always
71 See, e.g., New York v. AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 (2d Cir. 1991); J.A. Brun-
dage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Ins., 818 F. Supp. 553 (W.D.N.Y. 1993),
vacated by 153 F.R.D. 36 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Album Realty Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance
Co., 607 N.E.2d 804 (N.Y. 1992); Ace Wire & Cable Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 457
N.E.2d 761 (N.Y. 1983); Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 N.E.2d 37
(N.Y. 1974); Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 120 N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1918).
72 See Keeton, supra note 1, at 967. In addition, the Keeton article posited additional prin-
ciples creating policyholder rights beyond the terms of insurance policy text. According to
Keeton, "If the enforcement of a policy provision would defeat the reasonable expectations
of the great majority of policyholders to whose claims it is relevant, it will not be enforced
even against those who know of its restrictive terms." Id. at 974.
73 The rationale for the approach is based on several factors: complexity of policy lan-
guage; standardization of policies; the adhesion nature of most insurance policies; the con-
tracting process, in which insured almost never see the full policy until after it is in force and
seldom read it; and the need to protect unsophisticated or vulnerable insured, Id. at 963-85;
see also Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323,
324-30 (1986); Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honor-
ing the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1153-55 (1981).
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stopped short of full embrace of the approach as outlined in the Keeton
article.7 4
Well prior to Lachs, New York courts resisted policy construction incon-
sistent with the reasonable expectations of the policyholder in light of the
nature of the coverage purchased. For example, the court in Ira S. Bushey &
Sons v. American Insurance Co.,75 stated:
We are construing a policy of insurance and we are not bound by the niceties of
definition that might otherwise be proper. When a builder takes out builders' risk
insurance, delivers his materials on the ground, and does some manifest act evidenc-
ing his intention to incorporate them into a building, and when there is and can be no
dispute about his intention, it would be a harsh rule to require that he should protect
himself by a general open policy on stock in order to cover a loss sustained before he
had actually joined one timber to another. It was reasonable for the insured to
believe that it had covered the risk of loss by fire of its materials when it took out the
policy in suit. The ordinary builder would agree with the plaintiffs [policyholder's]
witness that "the building of the boat starts just as soon as you start getting that
material ready" and that such a construction of the policy expresses the fair and
reasonable understanding of the risk.7 6
In practice, then, the reasonable expectations of the policyholder have
proven vitally important for use in construing the policy's terms and meaning
well before there was a "reasonable expectations doctrine" as such and well
after the doctrine was enunciated. Courts continue to utilize the expectations
concept in construing insurance policies even though they may continue to talk
primarily in the more traditional language of textual meaning, ambiguity, con-
tra proferentem, absurd results, benefit of the bargain, and so on.
III. LAW WITHOUT LABELS: LACHS AND THE LONGSTANDING BUT
UNDERAPPRECIATED COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO
INSURANCE POLICY CONSTRUCTION
Most important in Lachs was that the court was not imprisoned by any one
factor, approach, or doctrine in seeking to render the correct construction of the
insurance policy at issue. Rather, the Lachs majority was deploying a variety
of tools for assessing contract meaning. In essence, the Lachs court was zero-
ing in on the legally controlling meaning of the policy and the transaction as its
consideration of text, intent, purpose, policyholder expectations, context, prac-
ticality, and public policy all led the court to conclude that Sadie Bernstein was
indeed covered under the policy and that her beneficiary could collect the mod-
est death benefit she had purchased at a relatively high premium cost.
The use of a vending machine to sell the insurance was a factor, but not
the overarching factor traditionally thought by most commentators. Rather, the
vending machine, like the specimen policy with the words obscured, the loca-
tion of the sale, and the circumstances of the trip, was just part of the overall
context that the court properly considered in order to interpret the policy and
71 See, e.g., In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 170 B.R. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Cont'l Cas. Co. v.
Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1993); Maurice Goldman & Sons, Inc. v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1992).
75 142 N.E. 340 (N.Y. 1923).
76 Id. at 342.
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decide a case involving an insurance policy with problematic language. Lachs
was not a case embracing a pumped-up version of the reasonable expectations
doctrine or torturing language in search of an ambiguity. It was a case decided
upon context and common sense.
In opposition to the decision, the dissent largely embraced, with a ven-
geance, a highly textual approach to construing the policy. One sees this scene
played again and again when courts address coverage disputes. Some judges
search for a textual basis for their decision in the belief that a decision on any
other basis imperils contract law and perhaps law itself.7 7 Other judges give
more consideration to surrounding circumstances, statements and conduct
reflecting on textual meaning, or the overall objective of the contract." This
dichotomy in contract interpretation has existed as long as contract law itself
and is most famously reflected in the differing views of the twentieth century's
giants of contract scholarship: Harvard Law's more textualist Samuel Williston
and Yale Law's more context-oriented Arthur Corbin.7 9 In the modern statu-
77 See, e.g., E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981) (applying Pennsylvania law) (courts must not "tor-
ture" language of insurance policy in order to find ambiguity that can be construed in favor
of policyholder); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Russell, 402 F.2d 339, 346 (10th Cir. 1968)
(applying Kansas law) ("The printed contract controls. There it ends").
78 Compare Kent Farms, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 998 P.2d 292, 295 (Wash. 2000) (consider-
ing overall purpose of policy, context of injury leading to claim, and seeking to give com-
mon sense application to absolute pollution exclusion) and Morton Int'l v. Gen. Accidental
Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994) (utilizing drafting
history of qualified pollution exclusion to resolve coverage controversy in favor of policy-
holder) with Northville Indus. Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d 1044, 1049
(N.Y. 1997) (reading language of qualified pollution exclusion to bar coverage for claims
arising out of gradual discharge); Technical Coating Applicators, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co., 157 F.3d 843 (11 th Cir. 1998) (applying Florida law) (holding that absolute pollution
exclusion bars coverage for claims against insulation manufacturer because fumes emitted
by insulation that caused injury were chemical "irritants" even though injury arose from use
as intended on job sight and not from waste discharge).
For example, in Dimmit Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp., 636
So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1993) (Dimmit 11) (overruling Dimmit I), the Florida Supreme Court
reflected this jurisprudential split both internally and as an institution. In Dimmit I, a major-
ity of the court was persuaded that the qualified or "sudden and accidental" pollution exclu-
sion (which covers pollution liability only if the discharge is sudden and accidental) applied
to gradual discharges that were not intended to cause injury based on the drafting history of
the exclusion. In Dimmit H, the court granted rehearing and reversed itself, holding that the
word "sudden" so clearly implied a temporal element of abruptness to the exclusion's
requirement for coverage that nontextual factors could not be considered to vary the meaning
of the words.
79 See, e.g., ARTHUR C. CORBIN, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1, at 1 (1950) (One Volume
Edition) (articulating reasonable expectations as basis for contract meaning - twenty years
prior to Keeton's Rights at Variance article). Although Williston was more of a textualist
and formalist than Corbin, he was not rigidly textualist as commonly thought. His treatise
on occasion reflects this, as do his other writings. See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS (1st ed. 1920 through 4th ed. 1990) (noting at various points that contract meaning
can be a product of factors). See, e.g., Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL
L.Q. 365, 374 (1921) (noting that legal effect of contract text must on occasion yield to
public policy concerns). See also NEIL DuxBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
21 (1995) (Williston was not as formalistic as commonly thought and in fact differed at
times with Harvard Dean Christopher Langdell on this point); Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of
Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49, 58-60 (1995) (modem contract literalists have overstated
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tory and administrative state, this historical fissure of the law is now also fre-
quently apparent on matters of statutory interpretation. 80 Lachs is a well-
decided and instructive case because it appreciates the importance of policy
language, but does so with regard to context and other important factors.
A textualist approach to insurance coverage is supported by several argu-
ments suggesting that reverence for text is necessary to: (a) provide predict-
ability in the law; (b) protect individual and social expectations; (c) prevent
contract disputes from being decided upon nonlegal factors, such as post-hoc
sympathy for a party; and (d) streamline judicial decision-making (if text is by
far the most important factor in construction it may save resources because it
focuses most on text and may avoid or reduce the search costs entailed in
examining other indicia of contract meaning).
Driven by these considerations, which are perfectly persuasive as a gen-
eral matter (and in cases where the textual meaning is in fact clear on its face),
courts can fall prey to hyper-literalism and interpret a term according to a dic-
tionary or technical definition even though this lends a result that is absurd or at
odds with contract purpose, party expectations, justice, or public policy. The
lure of textualism can also be sufficiently blinding that courts see contract lan-
guage as clearer than it really is.
The Lachs dissent arguably succumbed to this temptation. It embraced the
notion that "civilian scheduled airline" had a meaning clear to all and control-
ling as a matter of law with a zeal that is out of proportion to the actual linguis-
tic clarity of the words in question. The words are unclear on their face. Only
if a technical definition is employed (and even this is a stretch) are the words
relatively clear in meaning. But deciding the case on this basis turns insurance
law on its head by giving a term a technical meaning and applying it against the
policyholder, exactly the opposite of the hombook law of insurance even as set
forth by formalists.
To be fair, the Lachs dissent also considered context as well as text.81
Oddly, it did so in a manner that was both broader and narrower than the meth-
odology of the majority. The dissent had a narrow view of context in that it
was unwilling to consider important factors such as the vending machine, its
location, the circumstances, and the equities of the arrangement. Airline pas-
sengers are seldom ambling through the airport just itching to read dense pack
form contracts. Even today, only the most wired layperson could hope to ana-
lyze the Lachs policy in a manner that would suggest the meaning proferred by
the insurer. In the pre-Intemet, pre-Lexis and Westlaw, pre-laptop computer,
Williston's intellectual support for their position). But see Swisher, infra note 98 (Williston
remains most notable apostle of contract formalism).
80 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP K. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY Ch. 7 (2d ed. 1995) (reviewing theories of statutory construc-
tion and alternative approaches, including textualism, legislative intent, social purpose, and
public policy); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Inertial Burdens, and a Misleading
Theory of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 588 (1991) (summarizing schools of statu-
tory interpretation).
81 The text-context dichotomy is not my original organizing description of judicial activity.
See James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpreta-
tion?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 995 (1992).
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pre-cellular phone world of 1951, this was a complete impossibility not only
for Sadie Bernstein but for any airline passenger of the time.
But despite eschewing any consideration of most of the context of the
insurance transaction, the Lachs dissent is willing to range far and wide in
American society to find evidence that the lay public should know what an
insurer means when referring to scheduled and nonscheduled airlines. The dis-
sent invokes such authoritative chronicles of the American condition as For-
tune, Harper's, Time, and Cosmopolitan magazines (presumably in an era
when cleavage was less central to the Cosmo cover).8 2 The dissent's inconsis-
tency is a little startling: it is willing to scan popular periodicals for any use of
the terms scheduled and non-scheduled but is unwilling to consider that the
insurer had of its own volition placed the policyholder in a position where she
simply could not read the policy, reflect on its consequences, and (perhaps)
come to the same understanding as the insurer. Nor did the insurer bother to
define the term.
Worse yet, the dissent refuses to consider issues of risk involved in the
context of the transaction. The airline insurance policy's limitation of coverage
to scheduled flights is a proxy for the airline's desire to avoid covering passen-
gers riding on smaller planes operated by less experienced pilots and airlines.
But decedent Sadie Bernstein appears to have been flying on an aircraft that
was something more than a puddle-jumper. By contrast, policyholder-decedent
George Steven, of Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,83 arguably
the leading case in the area finding coverage for the insured, was clearly catch-
ing a ride on just such a "nonscheduled" flight when he found himself stranded
in the Terre Haute, Indiana airport en route to Chicago.84 The Steven Court
applied much of the approach of Lachs in finding for the beneficiary and the
cases are usually classified together. But the Lachs facts appear to present a
more compelling case for coverage.
Finally, at the risk of sounding like Robin Hood or Karl Marx, I cannot
resist criticizing the dissent for failing to appreciate what is at stake in Lachs.
Lachs is not a battle for the future of contract consistency. It is a case about a
single policyholder on a single flight with one beneficiary of a modest $25,000
policy. Finding for the beneficiary, as the majority does, will hardly break the
bank for this insurer or even make a dent in the insurance industry. The major-
ity opinion gives the insurer a road map for the future if it wishes to avoid
coverage in doubtful cases: make the limitations of the policy more conspicu-
ous, both with clearer language and better placement; change the location of the
vending machine; consider sales through agents who can check the flight in
question and disclaim coverage if it is not a covered flight.
82 Lachs v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y.,118 N.E.2d 555, 562-63 (N.Y. 1954). Perhaps more
forceful is the dissent's citation of Collier's Encyclopedia 266-72, 279 (1949). See id. at
563. However, the Collier's entry hardly indicates that laypersons possess an understanding
of a technical term that is, quite literally, "encyclopedic."
83 377 P.2d 284 (Cal. 1962).
4 See Id. at 286-87. George Steven and several other stranded passengers negotiated a
special flight with nonscheduled carrier Turner Aviation and were flying a small Piper Tri-
Pacer airplane when the craft crashed, killing Steven. The Steven case has 233 Shepard's
citing references as compared to the 138 citing references found for Lachs as of my LEXIS
search of June 6, 2001.
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Under the Lachs approach, the policyholder and her beneficiary are
treated fairly but an insurer that wishes to continue to sell the flight insurance
product can, with a few modifications, continue to sell the product and limit its
risk quite handily. For example, in Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Rus-
sell,85 which is often cited as the antithesis of Lachs, the insurance policy in
question was considerably clearer, it provided coverage only for a set period of
time and this was known to the policyholder at the time of purchase. 86 When
her departure was delayed by hours and the Russell court ruled that her death
was outside coverage, this may have been tragic but it was not the result of an
unclear and obscure provision of the type at issue in Lachs. Consequently,
although Lachs and Russell reflect different receptiveness to empathy for the
beneficiary and nontextual means of contract construction, the cases are quite
reconcilable.
Lachs may be more pro-policyholder than insurers would prefer, but it is
hardly a left-wing stab at the heart of the sanctity of contract text. Rather,
Lachs stands as a good example of an understated, comprehensive, eclectic
approach to insurance coverage. Without becoming theologically zealous in
favor of any single approach or factor, it is an exercise in practical reason that
produces a most defensible opinion.87 At the time Lachs was decided, the
world of contracts jurisprudence (and by implication the world of insurance
jurisprudence) was aligned according to the Williston/formalism-vs-Corbin/
realism and instrumentalism debate.
Despite the passage of time and dramatic changes in society and the law,
the same divide continues to animate insurance coverage disputes as reflected
in the different decisions regarding the qualified pollution exclusion, the abso-
lute pollution exclusion, administrative cleanup response costs, the insured-vs-
insured exclusion in D & 0 policies, coverage of "experimental" medical treat-
ment, business risk exclusions, and a variety of other contemporary disputes.
Airline flight insurance and vending machines may have receded from the legal
consciousness, but the Lachs holding and method continues to hold persuasive
force.
How persuasive was the comprehensive approach of Lachs? And what
are the implications for this continuing tension of insurance and contract law?
Recall that Lachs was a 4-3 decision, with the celebrated Judge Stanley Fuld in
dissent8 8 to the lesser known Judge Albert Conway's majority opinion.89
85 402 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1968) (applying Kansas law).
86 See id. at 341-42.
87 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 80, at 604-06 (reviewing scholarship on practical
reason and statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reason, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1992).
88 Fuld was one of the most prestigious judges in the history of the Court of Appeals and
was viewed as a mid-century Cardozo by many. See Symposium, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 531
(1971) (collection of articles praising Fuld, with issue of Law Review dedicated to Fuld in
recognition of twenty-five years of "distinguished service."). See, e.g., John M. Harlan,
Chief Judge Fuld: A Salute from Washington, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 535 (Justice Harlan lauds
Judge Fuld); Thomas E. Dewey, The Making of a Judge, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 537 (1971)
(former New York Governor and presidential candidate praises Fuld as "born to judge"; Fuld
had been an assistant to Dewey when Dewey emerged on the public and political scene as a
crusading prosecutor); Michael I. Sovern, Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
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Across the history of the case, the pro-coverage position has more, if perhaps
less prominent, adherents. The trial judge found for the beneficiary9" as did the
intermediate appellate court, by a 4-1 margin. 9 ' The final tally of judicial view
on Lachs, then, is a rather resounding 9-4, suggesting substantial judicial sup-
port for the eclectic, comprehensive approach to policy construction.
The small sample of "scheduled airlines" vending machine insurance
cases does, however, illustrate the overall close division of judges and the legal
profession on these matters. The California trial judge in Steven v. Fidelity &
Casualty found the scheduled airlines language clear and ruled that there was
no coverage for the policyholder.9 2 The California Supreme Court famously
reversed in a 5-2 vote, with its most famous member, former University of
California law professor Roger Traynor, generally viewed as a contracts "lib-
eral" and intellectual of the law, in dissent.9 3 On petition for rehearing, the vote
545 (1971) (Dean of Columbia Law School lauds Fuld as "whiz kid" who has "analytical
power and decisional influence in a wide range of substantive and procedural fields" noting
that "comparison with Cardozo is inevitable"). Fuld's legacy was further burnished by the
success of his former law clerks, who included Jack B. Weinstein, now a celebrated federal
district judge, Maurice Rosenberg, who became a prominent Columbia Law School profes-
sor (as was Weinstein prior to being appointed to the bench), and Kenneth R. Feinberg, a
nationally known expert on mass torts and dispute resolution, recently appointed as Special
Master administering the United States Government compensation fund for September I I
victims. All three wrote tributes to Fuld in the Columbia Law Review symposium issue on
Fuld.
89 By contrast to Fuld, Conway was a respected but hardly celebrated judge and was
regarded as a politician and public servant more than as an intellectual. See, e.g., Judge
Albert Conway, 80, Dead; Headed State Court of Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1969, at
B20 (obituary of Conway notes judicial and government service, emphasizing that he was a
"protege of John H. McCooey, the Brooklyn Democratic leader, and of Franklin D.
Roosevelt."). Conway appears not to have been the subject of any sustained law review or
other scholarly commentary as was Fuld. On the day of Conway's obituary, the death of
Marion Morehouse Cummings, third wife of poet E.E. Cummings (and also, to be fair, a
prominent fashion model and accomplished photographer), was noted with an obituary that
was just as prominent and nearly as long as that of Conway. See Marion Morehouse Cum-
mings, Poet's Widow, Top Model, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1969, at B20.
90 See Lachs v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 121 N.Y.S.2d 230, 232 (App. Div. 1953) (trial
court ruled that flight insurance policy language regarding civilian scheduled airlines was
sufficiently ambiguous to trigger contra proferentem principle and decision in favor of
beneficiary).
91 See id. (per curiam opinion affirming trial court is supported by Justices Glennon, Dore,
Van Voorhis, and Bergan with Justice Peck in dissent). Justice Peck viewed the term
"scheduled airline" as clear and was "unable to see that any further development of the facts
at trial that could lead to any conclusion other than that the policy in question did not cover
the flight in question." See id. Unlike the Court of Appeals dissent, the Peck dissent does
not invoke Cosmopolitan or other popular periodicals to make its case of linguistic meaning.
92 See Steven v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 377 P.2d 284 (Cal. 1962) (noting trial court
decision, from which insurance company sought Supreme Court review by petition).
13 See id. at 298. See also Stewart Macauley, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13
STAN. L. REv. 812 (1961) (praising Traynor and discussing his contract law opinions at
length, finding most of them comprehensive and progressive in approach). Noting to any
degree the articles celebrating Traynor's jurisprudence would be even more space-consum-
ing than mentioning those lauding New York Court of Appeals Judge Fuld. See supra note
89, regarding Fuld.
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was 4-3.94 In the 1950s and 1960s, as today, there appears to be a judicial
preference for contextual contract construction, but it may be a fragile majority
rule.
Interestingly, the anti-coverage position in Lachs and Steven was champi-
oned by two of the most famous state supreme court jurists of the twentieth
century Stanley Fuld and Roger Traynor. One must be careful about reading
too much into this but I cannot help but think that this is more than coincidence.
Law historically has celebrated not only text but the presumed value of text in
fostering the legal values of certainty, predictability, efficiency, and private,
market-based arrangements. Law has also historically celebrated hard-headed-
ness in legal analysis, the notion that courts write to make systemic rules at
least as much as to decide individual cases. Reverence for these goals of the
system can lead even the best judges to overstate the clarity of text or the
primacy of text in comparison to other factors surrounding a contract. In my
view, both Fuld and Traynor made this mistake in adopting the anti-coverage
position under the circumstances of Lachs and Steven.
By contrast, the far less famous Conway rendered in Lachs an opinion that
may not have fit the linear mode of neoclassical contract theory but made both
a good decision in the case at hand and rendered good law for the future in its
more comprehensive examination of the insurance policy at issue. The lack of
syllogistic precision in Lachs may make it seem unimpressively result oriented
to some. I see it as a strength. Steven has similar strengths but reads more as a
public policy manifesto and can be faulted by legal purists on these grounds.95
IV. CONCLUSION: SPEAKING PROSE ALL ALONG
Without appropriate nomenclature, it is difficult if not impossible to even
discuss matters with care and accuracy. Consider the not uncommon problem
of two native speakers of different languages attempting to communicate. Even
when each has been taught the other's language, communication breaks down if
both languages do not have words for the same concept. For example, German
has two words for the English word "law," "gesetz" (the written code of posi-
tive law) and "recht" (the law of fairness or what Anglophones call justice).
The American speaking German may miscommunicate if he simply substitutes
"gesetz" for "law" in all her translations. If the correct term is used, better
focus on the concept follows as a matter of course.
9 6
9' See Steven, 377 P.2d at 298 (noting subsequent history) (Justices Traynor, Schauer, and
McComb indicated they supported the rehearing petition).
95 Steven also undermines to some extent the mini-thesis of this paragraph: that smart
judges can be overly beguiled by the false gods of textual meaning and contract certainty
while judges perhaps wrongly regarded as less cerebral may often render better opinions by
being less imprisoned by the traditional dictates as to what constitutes sound legal analysis.
Steven was authored by Justice Matthew Tobriner, a prestigious jurist, but one regarded as
something of an ultra-liberal, perhaps because he so strongly invoked public policy in his
opinions, arguably elevating it over contract groundrules and other legal doctrine.
96 See George P. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 980 (1981)
(using Gesetz-Recht analogy to illustrate similar point regarding law generally and legal
scholarship in particular). See also George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98
HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985) (continuing exploration on this topic).
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So it is with insurance coverage. A full explanation of a court's analysis
and holding proves difficult when the language of the decision is insufficiently
appreciative of the court's approach. Lachs at first blush reads as though it is
primarily an ambiguity-based opinion or perhaps one unduly influenced by
judicial sympathy. With hindsight, some commentators have seen it as a rea-
sonable expectations opinion handed down before the concept was fully
defined. But both characterizations do not fully and fairly explain the decision.
Lachs is an eclectic and comprehensive opinion, one that considered with care
the facial language of the policy, the context of the transaction, the purpose of
the insurance policy, and the jurisprudential tides pulling in different directions
for insurer and policyholder. In a way, Lachs is not so much a reasonable
expectations opinion prior to the "birth" of the doctrine as it is a post-modem
opinion before post-modemism was consciously recognized. 97 Lachs is an
example of pragmatism and practical reason before these terms were common
features of legal scholarship. If one had to label Lachs, one should probably
call it pragmatic, comprehensively analytical, contextual, or holistic rather than
trying to pigeonhole it as a case of ambiguity, reasonable expectations, or some
other school of thought.
One should, however, acknowledge that Lachs was decided during some-
thing of a quieter era of insurance coverage disputes. Lachs itself involved
only one policy and one insured life, it was not the tip of a mass tort or insur-
ance iceberg as were the cases triggering asbestos coverage. The fate of no
industry hung in the balance and the court of appeals was refreshingly free of
such pressure. The past twenty years have seen an explosion of insurance law
scholarship, but much of it is the work of high-powered practitioners who spe-
cialize in representing one side or the other in high stakes cases. As a result,
insurance law scholarship can be "cacophonous" (to borrow Judge Posner's
description of statutory interpretation writing),9 8 as can the holdings of state
courts, which have been diametrically opposed on some of the leading insur-
ance questions of the modem era. 99 Although Lachs was of course affected by
97 See Peter Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statu-
tory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505 (1992) (suggesting that acceptance of some
postmodern precepts, such as social construction of knowledge, auger in favor of less
foundationalist and more comprehensive approaches to statutory interpretation).
98 See Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REv.
431, 434 (1989). See, e.g., STEMPEL, supra note 4; BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R.
NEWMAN, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DisPuTEs (10th ed. 2000); Peter Nash
Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000); Symposium, The Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine After Three Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998-99); Kenneth S. Abraham, A The-
ory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531 (1996); Peter Nash Swisher,
Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground
Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543 (1996); Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and
Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30
GA. L. REv. 171 (1995); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special
Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992); Peter Nash
Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Of the Formal for the Function, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. (1991); Stephen J. Ware, Note, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (1989).
99 See STEMPEL, supra note 4, especially §§ 14.11-14.12 (noting sharp and relatively equal
division of states concerning pollution exclusions and coverage for pollution cleanup costs).
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the longstanding text/formalism-vs-context/functionalism dichotomy in the
law, Lachs was undisturbed by these as yet unfelt currents of higher stakes,
high theory insurance mega-disputes. As a result, it may have been better able
to render a more comprehensive decision even though the opinion lacked the
terminology to fully describe what it had done.
Lachs demonstrates the degree to which the best judging is broad based
and sensitive to facts, fairness, and public policy. It also reflects the degree to
which good judicial opinions do not always self-consciously set forth their
niche in jurisprudential thought. Optimal insurance policy construction like
that in Lachs also reflects an appropriate humility as to the certainty of the
meaning of words. In short, Lachs is something of an underappreciated jewel,
one that perhaps should be displayed more often and more prominently to illu-
minate modem judicial inquiry into the meaning of insurance policies and other
contracts.
